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Abstract—Data centers are key participants in demand re-
sponse programs, including emergency demand response (EDR),
where the grid coordinates large electricity consumers for
demand reduction in emergency situations to prevent major
economic losses. While existing literature concentrates on owner-
operated data centers, this work studies EDR in multi-tenant
colocation data centers where servers are owned and managed by
individual tenants. EDR in colocation data centers is significantly
more challenging, due to lack of incentives to reduce energy
consumption by tenants who control their servers and are
typically on fixed power contracts with the colocation operator.
Consequently, to achieve demand reduction goals set by the EDR
program, the operator has to rely on the highly expensive and/or
environmentally-unfriendly on-site energy backup/generation. To
reduce cost and environmental impact, an efficient incentive
mechanism is therefore in need, motivating tenants’ voluntary
energy reduction in case of EDR. This work proposes a novel in-
centive mechanism, Truth-DR, which leverages a reverse auction
to provide monetary remuneration to tenants according to their
agreed energy reduction. Truth-DR is computationally efficient,
truthful, and achieves 2-approximation in colocation-wide social
cost. Trace-driven simulations verify the efficacy of the proposed
auction mechanism.
I. INTRODUCTION
For improving the efficiency, reliability and sustainability of
power grids, demand response programs are adopted in many
countries for exploiting flexibility of electricity usage on the
consumer side in response to supply-demand conditions. (see
[1] for an overview). Large-scale data centers, given their large
yet flexible power demands, are widely identified as having
a great potential in demand response participation [1], [2].
Notably, data centers have many IT computing knobs (e.g.,
server speed scaling, workload shedding/migration), as well
as non-IT knobs (e.g., battery, cooling system), which are all
great assets for demand response to mutually benefit them-
selves and the power grid [1]. For example, data centers can
reduce skyrocketing electricity costs by optimizing workload
management, exploiting time-varying and location-dependent
electricity prices. Furthermore, data center demand response
helps improve power grid efficiency and increase adoption
of volatile renewables, by reducing power demand upon low
renewable generation, to balance realtime supply-demand [1].
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Among various benefits of data center demand response
[1], an important, perhaps even the most striking, benefit
is the enhancement of power grid reliability through emer-
gency demand response (EDR). In emergency situations (e.g.,
extreme weather conditions), EDR coordinates many large
energy consumers (including data centers) for power demand
reduction, and serves as the last line of defense for power grids
before cascading blackouts take place, preventing economic
losses in the order of billions of dollars [3], [4]. In view of
the aging grid infrastructure, surging demand and increasingly
frequent extreme weather, EDR has undeniably become crit-
ically important and seen an upward trend: in PJM, a major
regional transmission organization in the U.S., the capacity of
EDR power reduction commitment increases from 1, 700MW
in 2006 − 2007 to 10, 800MW in 2011 − 2012 [3]. Because
of their huge yet flexible power demand, data centers serve
as “energy buffers” and have been identified by U.S. EPA as
valuable assets for EDR [2]. As an example, on July 22, 2011,
hundreds of data centers participated in EDR and contributed
by cutting their electricity usage before a nation-wide blackout
occurred in the U.S. and Canada [4].
Existing research on data center demand response heavily
concentrates on owner-operated data centers (e.g., Google)
[1], [5]. In contrast, we study EDR in a critical yet unique
type of data centers, multi-tenant colocation data centers as
exemplified by Equinix and often known as “colocation” or
“colo”. Unlike owner-operated data centers where operators
fully manage both servers and facilities, colocation rents
physical space out to multiple tenants for housing their own
servers, while the colocation operator is mainly responsible
for facility support such as cooling and power supply (more
details in Sec II). Our study on colocation EDR has a two-
fold motivation. First, colocations are widely-existing (over
1,200 in the U.S. alone [6]), and according to Google [7],
“most large data centers” are colocations. Second, many large
colocations reside in densely-populated metropolitan areas
such as the Silicon Valley [6], where EDR is particularly
critical for peak demand reduction, unlike mega-scale owner-
operated data centers (e.g., Google) in rural areas with low
population densities.
Enabling colocation EDR is challenging because, unlike in
owner-operated data centers, colocation power management
is highly “uncoordinated”: the colocation operator purchases
electricity from the power grid and manages the facility,
whereas individual tenants manage their own servers and
power consumption. There is a “split incentive” hurdle: while
the colocation operator desires cutting electricity usage for
financial compensation received from the power grid in case
of EDR, tenants have little incentive for reducing their power
consumption, because they are typically billed by the coloca-
tion based on their subscribed/reserved power at fixed rates
regardless of energy consumption (on top of other power-
irrelevant fees such as network connectivity) [8]. To achieve
the energy reduction target during EDR, a colocation operator
has to resort to highly expensive and/or environmentally-
unfriendly energy generation devices (e.g., diesel generators).
To reduce the cost and environmental impact of such back-
up power generation, the tenants should be effectively incen-
tivized to voluntarily cut down their power consumption in
case of EDR.
This work proposes a novel incentive mechanism, called
Truth-DR, which breaks the split-incentive hurdle by finan-
cially rewarding tenants to reduce energy consumption for
EDR. Truth-DR is based on a reverse auction: upon the
notification of an EDR event, tenants voluntarily submit bids
to specify the amount of their planned energy reduction as
well as the associated costs; the colocation operator, as the
auctioneer, then decides which bids to accept and the actual
monetary reward. Tenants are naturally self-interested and may
not truthfully reveal their costs to the colocation operator. Even
if tenants are truthful, the problem of deciding the winning
bids involves mixed linear integer programming (MLIP) and
is NP-hard. Consequently, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
type mechanism [9]–[11], well-known for guaranteeing truth-
fulness and economical efficiency (social cost minimization),
becomes computationally infeasible and is not applicable.
Instead, we design Truth-DR based on a randomized auction
mechanism, which employs a primal-dual approximation al-
gorithm for winner determination, and strategically assigns
rewards to elicit truthful bids. Furthermore, Truth-DR is
computationally efficient, individually rational, and guarantees
a 2-approximation in colocation-wide social cost, compared
with the optimum solution of the NP-hard MLIP problem.
We conduct trace-based simulations to validate Truth-DR and
corroborate our theoretical analysis, demonstrating the desired
efficiency in (social) cost reduction.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Related work
is reviewed in Section II. The system model and the prob-
lem formulation are described in Section III. In Section IV,
we present the 2-approximation algorithm and develop our
mechanism Truth-DR. Section V provides a simulation study.
Finally, concluding remarks are offered in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
• Colocation is an integral segment of the data center industry.
The now U.S.$25 billion global colocation market is expected
to grow to U.S.$43 billion by 2018 with a projected annual
compound growth rate of 11% [12]. Colocation provides a
unique data center solution to many industry sectors, including
leading IT firms such as Twitter, who choose not to construct
and maintain private data centers or completely outsource IT
demands to public cloud providers (due to concerns of privacy
and losing control of data). Even top IT companies, such as
Microsoft, house some servers in colocations to complement
their own data center infrastructure.
Furthermore, colocation is an indispensable enabler for
cloud computing, serving as physical homes for many public
cloud services offered by small-/medium-scale cloud providers
(e.g., Salesforce, Box), which are not “large” enough to
construct mega-scale data centers [13]. Last but not least,
colocation provides physical support for a significant portion
of the Internet traffic, because content delivery network (CDN)
providers will handle 55% of Internet traffic by 2018 (up from
36% in 2013) in their servers housed in global colocations in
close proximity to user bases [14].
• Data center demand response. The critical role of data
centers is attracting increasing attention in the field of demand
response. Ghatikar et al. [5] conduct field tests to verify the
feasibility of data center demand response. Ghamkhari et al.
[15] and Aikema et al. [16] optimize data center computing
resources to provide ancillary services provided by utility.
Studies in [17], [18] investigate the interactions between data
centers and utilities, as well as pricing strategies of utilities.
The above studies focus on owner-operated data centers where
operators have full control over the servers, and are not
applicable to colocations. A recent study [13] proposes a
simple mechanism, iCODE, for colocation demand response,
which however cannot be applied to enable emergency demand
response in colocation data centers, because: (1) iCODE is
purely based on tenants’ best-effort reduction that may not
meet energy reduction target for EDR; and (2) iCODE is not
truthful, and strategic tenants can report falsified costs to gain
extra benefits.
• Auction and its applications. Zhang et al. [19] propose a
randomized auction for dynamic virtual machine provisioning
in cloud computing. Shi et al. [20] further extend it to an online
version where the future knowledge is unknown. However,
both problems are essentially of a packing type rather than
covering type as in this work, and simple extension is not
applicable (as shown in Section IV). A decomposition-based
randomized auction is proposed for the uncapacitated facility
location problem [21]. However, it requires a Lagrangian mul-
tiplier preserving approximation algorithm for the underlying
problem, which does not exist in our problem. Zhang et
al. [22] design a reverse auction for the electricity market,
nevertheless it is not absolutely truthful.
To our knowledge, this paper represents the first step to
enable cost-effective EDR in a colocation data center with an
efficient and truthful incentive mechanism.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Colocation data center and EDR
Consider a colocation data center with N tenants, oper-
ated by one colocation operator. Each tenant i ∈ N =
{1, 2, · · · , N} manages its own servers and subscribes a
certain amount of power supply from the colocation operator
TABLE I: Summary of Notations
Notation Description Notation Description
N # of tenants in colocation δ Energy reduction target set by power grid
α BES cost for one unit of power reduction γ PUE (ratio of colocation energy consumption to IT energy consumption)
ni # of servers turned off by tenant i fi The payment that the colocation operator provides to a winning tenant i
ei Energy reduction by tenant i xi Binary variable indicating whether bid i wins or not
bi Reported cost by tenant i y Continuous variable indicating amount of energy provided by BES
based on a negotiated contract, e.g., 500kW for 24 months
at a typical rate of U.S.$150/kW/month [8]. The coloca-
tion operator is responsible for facility management such as
cooling. In the event of EDR, a signal is received by the
colocation operator from the grid, specifying the amount of
energy reduction, δ, which the colocation needs to reduce in
one EDR period (e.g., one hour [23]) [3]. Such mandatory
EDR with a given reduction target is becoming a mainstream
approach for EDR to prevent grid-wide blackouts in emergent
situations [3].
Colocation power consumption consists of two parts: IT
consumption (due to the running servers) controlled by the
tenants, and non-IT consumption manageable by the coloca-
tion operator. The ratio of the total energy consumption to
IT energy consumption is called Power Usage Effectiveness
(PUE) γ, which typically ranges from 1.1 to 2.0.
Given power-based contracts, tenants may not actively par-
ticipate in EDR unless incentivized. Even if some tenants are
interested in EDR, their reduction may not collectively reach
the energy reduction target δ. Hence, the colocation operator
often needs to leverage its BES (backup energy storage) to
fulfill the shortage of EDR target. Common BES that can
produce extra power supply include pre-charged batteries and
diesel generators, which are expensive and/or environment
unfriendly [16], [24]. Let y be the amount of grid-power
demand reduction due to the usage of BES, and α be the
cost of BES usage per kWh. Such a cost comes from various
sources such as wear-and-tear, recharging energy or fuels.
Table I summarizes key notations in the paper.
B. Reverse Auction
The proposed solution, Truth-DR, is based on a reverse
auction: when EDR signal is issued by the power grid, the
colocation operator solicits demand response bids (including
the planned energy reduction and associated costs) from
tenants.1 The colocation operator then selects winning bids,
decides payments to the winners, and notifies tenants of the
auction outcome, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
Bids. Each tenant i voluntarily submits a bid to the coloca-
tion operator, which specifies two values: (i) planned energy
reduction ei; and (ii) claimed cost bi due to such a reduction.
Each tenant i has its own discretion to determine its true cost
ci (which our mechanism will guarantee to be the same as
the claimed cost). We will give examples on how each tenant
1It is not appealing to directly pass down the grid operator’s financial
compensation from the colocation operator to tenants, because tenants’
responses (i.e., how much energy reduction) are unknown until the end of
EDR and consequently, the colocation operator has to primarily rely on its
BES for meeting EDR requirement.
Tenant 1 Tenant 2 Tenant 3 Tenant N
...
Step1: EDR signal
Step2: Solicit bids from tenants
Step3: Submit bids
Step4: Notify tenants winning bids & payments
Colocation Operator
(Auctioneer)
Fig. 1: An illustration of the reverse auction in Truth-DR.
decides its energy reduction and cost in Section V. We also
implicitly allow (0, 0) as a bid, indicating that a tenant is not
interested and can be excluded from EDR.
Winner determination (social cost minimization). The util-
ity of tenant i is defined as the payment it receives minus its
true cost. The following properties are pursued in our auction
design: (i) Truthfulness (in expectation). Bidding true costs is
a dominant strategy at the tenants, for maximum utility (in
expectation). (ii) Individual rationality. A non-negative utility
is obtained by each truth-telling tenant participating in the
auction. (iii) Computation efficiency. The auction should run
in polynomial time for winner and payment determination. (iv)
Social cost minimization. We aim at enabling colocation EDR
at the minimum colocation-wide (social) cost, to transform a
colocation’s formidable power demand into an asset.
Let xi be a binary variable indicating whether tenant i’s
bid is successful (1) or not (0), and fi be the payment
that the colocation operator provides to a winning tenant i.
The social cost in the colocation is the sum of tenants’ net
costs, i.e., cost due to energy reduction minus award from
the colocation operator,
∑
i∈N bixi −
∑
i∈N fixi (assuming
truthful bidding), and the colocation operator’s cost in using
BES and providing financial awards to the winning tenants,
i.e., αy +
∑
i∈N fixi. With payments cancelling themselves,
the social cost is equivalent to aggregate tenant cost due to
energy reduction plus the operator’s cost for using BES, i.e.,∑
i∈N bixi + αy, which represents the negative impact of
energy reduction on colocation operation.
Social cost is a commonly-studied metric in mechanism
design and data center demand response [17]. Minimizing the
social cost is equivalent to maximizing the social welfare in
our system, considering that the financial compensation paid
by the grid operator to the colocation operator for EDR is
fixed. Such a financial compensation is typically computed as
the compensation rate times the amount of energy reduction.
Both the compensation rate and the energy reduction target
are typically determined using separate mechanisms [3]. For
example, the compensation rate is often determined through
a separate market between the power grid and many EDR
participants (e.g., data centers), which cannot be manipulated
by a single data center. The energy reduction target is also
determined well beforehand, e.g., the colocation may commit
an energy reduction capacity for EDR three years ahead [3].
We formulate below the social cost minimization problem,
referred to as MinCost, which provides the optimal winner de-
termination decisions and usage of BES (i.e., EDR strategies)
for the colocation operator, to achieve the energy reduction
target δ, assuming truthful bids are known.
MinCost: minimizex,y αy +
∑
i∈N
bixi (1)
subject to:
y + γ
∑
i∈N
eixi ≥ δ, (1a)
xi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ N , (1b)
y ≥ 0. (1c)
where γ ·
∑
i∈N eixi is the colocation-level energy reduction
resulting from tenants’ server energy reduction
∑
i∈N eixi.
MinCost belongs to minimum knapsack problems and is
NP-hard [25]. This makes direct application of the VCG
mechanism computationally infeasible, for VCG requires ex-
actly solving the underlying winner determination problem
multiple times. We instead design a randomized auction that
is truthful in expectation and also computationally efficient.
Before concluding this section, we note that a baseline, based
on average energy consumption of the same time during past
weeks, will be used to verify tenants’ actual energy reduction,
which is typical in incentive-based approaches and similar to
how power utility verifies its customer’s energy reduction [3].
IV. TRUTH-DR: TRUTHFUL INCENTIVE MECHANSIM
This section develops a truthful and efficient mechanism,
called Truth-DR, to incentivize tenants’ participation in EDR.
Truth-DR works based on a randomized mechanism that
converts a 2-approximation algorithm, which solves the social
cost minimization problem, into a truthful and computational
efficient auction. We prove that the randomized auction also
achieves a 2-approximation ratio in social cost. In what
follows, we first design an efficient, 2-approximation algo-
rithm based on a primal-dual technique, and then design the
randomized auction using the algorithm as a plug-in module
to achieve truthfulness.
A. A 2-Approximation Algorithm
To efficiently solve MinCost in (1) for winner determination
and BES usage, a natural approach is to relax the integrality
constraints (1b) to 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ N , to obtain a linear
program (LP), solve it using standard LP solution techniques,
and then round the (possibly) fractional solution x to integers.
However, the integrality gap, i.e., the ratio between the optimal
social cost of (1) to the optimal social cost of the relaxed
LP, can be unbounded. For example, consider a case where
only one tenant participates in the auction, with N = 1, b1 =
1, e1 = α > 1, γ = 1, δ = 1. The optimal integer solution to
(1) is (x1 = 1, y = 0), and the social cost is 1. The relaxed
LP however would pick a solution (x1 = 1/α, y = 0), which
results in a social cost of 1/α. The integrality gap is hence α,
which is unbounded when α→∞.
We design an efficient primal-dual algorithm to provide
a feasible solution to (1), which provably achieves a 2-
approximation in social cost, based on an enhanced LP re-
laxation of (1). Following the technique of redundant LP
constraints [25], [26], we introduce valid inequalities that are
satisfied by all feasible mixed integer solutions of (1) into the
LP relaxation.
Let S be a subset of bids in N . Define ∆(S) = δ −
γ
∑
i∈S ei, denoting how much energy reduction the coloca-
tion still needs to achieve the target δ, when all bids in S are
accepted. Let ei(S) = min{γei,∆(S)} denote the contribu-
tion of an additional bid i in making up the discrepancy. The
enhanced linear program relaxation (LPR) is:
LPR-Primal: minimize αy +
∑
i∈N
bixi (2)
subject to:
y +
∑
i∈N\S
ei(S)xi ≥ ∆(S), ∀S ⊆ N : ∆(S) > 0 (2a)
y ≥ 0, xi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N (2b)
Constraints in (2a) can be considered as an enumeration of all
possible solutions to achieve the energy reduction target. Each
constraint in (2a) assumes that all bids in subset S, ∀S ⊆ N ,
are accepted, and limit the solution space to decisions on other
bids in N \S, to make up for the gap ∆(S) > 0 to the energy
reduction target. Clearly any feasible mixed integer solution
(xi being integer) to LPR (2) is feasible to the original problem
(1), and vice versa. We next formulate the dual of LPR (2)
by introducing a dual variable z(S) corresponding to each
constraint in (2a).
LPR-Dual: maximize
∑
S⊆N :∆(S)>0
∆(S)z(S) (3)
subject to: ∑
S⊆N :∆(S)>0
z(S) ≤ α (3a)
∑
S⊆N :i∈N\S,∆(S)>0
ei(S)z(S) ≤ bi ∀i ∈ N (3b)
z(S) ≥ 0 ∀S ⊆ N : ∆(S) > 0 (3c)
Algorithm 1 shows the approximation algorithm, based on
the LPR (2) and its dual (3), to derive a feasible, 2-approximate
solution to MinCost in (1). The idea of the algorithm is to
Algorithm 1 A Primal-Dual 2-Approx. Algorithm for (1)
1: Input: (α, γ,e, b, δ)
2: Output: solution (x, y)
3: //initialization
4: (x, y) = (0, 0); z = 0; C = ∅;
5: while ∆(C) > 0 do //Update primal/dual variables iteratively
6: Increase dual variable z(C) until some dual constraint goes
tight;
7: if
∑
S⊆N :∆(S)>0 z(S) = α then
8: y = ∆(C); break;
9: end if
10: if
∑
S⊆N :i∈N\S,∆(S)>0 ei(S)z(S) = bi then
11: xi = 1; C = C ∪ {i};
12: end if
13: end while
construct a mixed integer solution to LPR (2) and a feasible
solution to its dual (3) iteratively by increasing the dual
variable corresponding to the current set of bids to accept,
C, until the aggregate power from accepted bids in C reaches
the energy reduction target δ.
Lemma 1. Algorithm 1 computes a feasible solution to
MinCost in (1) and LPR (2), as well as a feasible solution
to dual (3).
The proof of the lemma is in the technical report [27].
Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 is a 2-approximation algorithm to
MinCost in (1); it achieves a social cost that is at most 2 times
the optimal social cost of (1).
Proof: Let OPT denote the optimal social cost computed
by solving (1) exactly, and OPTLPR be the optimal social
cost computed by its LPR (2). We analyze the algorithm in
the following two cases.
Case 1: the while loop stops due to ∆(C) ≤ 0. The
constraint (3a) never goes tight in this case, and hence y = 0.∑
i∈N
bixi =
∑
i∈C
bi =
∑
i∈C
∑
S⊆N :i∈N\S,∆(S)>0
ei(S)z(S)
=
∑
S⊆N :∆(S)>0
∑
i∈C\S
ei(S)z(S)
Note that∑
i∈C\S
ei(S) ≤ γ
∑
i∈C\{ω}
ei − γ
∑
i∈S
ei + eω(S)
< δ − γ
∑
i∈S
ei + eω(S)
= ∆(S) + eω(S) ≤ 2∆(S)
where ω denotes the last tenant added to the solution set C.
∆(C \ω) > 0 implies that δ > γ
∑
i∈C\{ω} ei. As a result, we
have∑
i∈N
bixi ≤
∑
S⊆N :∆(S)>0
2z(S)∆(S) ≤ 2OPTLPR ≤ 2OPT
Case 2: the while loop stops due to the break in line 8. The
objective of the LPR then has two parts: αy and
∑
i∈N bixi.
αy = ∆(C)
∑
S⊆N :∆(S)>0
z(S)
Since S ⊆ C, ∀S : ∆(S) > 0 and z(S) ̸= 0, we have ∆(S) ≥
∆(C). Therefore
αy ≤
∑
S⊆N :∆(S)>0
z(S)∆(S) ≤ OPTLPR.
Similar to the analysis in Case 1, we have:∑
i∈N
bixi =
∑
S⊆N :∆(S)>0
∑
i∈C\S
ei(S)z(S)
≤
∑
S⊆N :∆(S)>0
z(S)(γ
∑
i∈C
ei − γ
∑
i∈S
ei)
Note that the algorithm exits with ∆(C) > 0, i.e., δ >
γ
∑
i∈C ei. We have:∑
i∈N
bixi ≤
∑
S⊆N :∆(S)>0
z(S)(δ − γ
∑
i∈S
ei)
=
∑
S⊆N :∆(S)>0
z(S)∆(S) = OPTLPR
Therefore, αy +
∑
i∈N bixi ≤ 2OPTLPR ≤ 2OPT .
B. The Randomized Auction
The idea of Truth-DR is as follows. We compute the optimal
fractional solution to LPR in (2), and then employ an LP dual-
ity based decomposition technique to decompose the fractional
solution into a convex combination of feasible, mixed integer
solutions to MinCost in (1). The decomposition exploits the
covering structure of the MinCost problem, according to
a sequence of recent work that originated from theoretical
computer science [21], [28], [29]. We then randomly pick one
of the mixed integer solutions as the outcome of the auction,
using their weights in the convex combination as probabilities.
The payments to the winners are computed according to the
rule in Theorem 2, which satisfy the sufficient and necessary
condition for truthfulness. The auction mechanism is given in
Algorithm 2, with details below.
1) Optimal Fractional Solution: The optimal fractional so-
lution (x∗, y∗) can be computed by solving LPR (2), applying
an efficient LP solution technique such as the primal-dual
interior-point method.
2) Convex Decomposition: The goal of the decomposition
is to find νl ∈ [0, 1] and a set of mixed integer solutions
(xl, yl), ∀l ∈ I, to the MinCost problem in (1), such that∑
l∈I νlx
l = x∗,
∑
l∈I νly
l = y∗, and
∑
l∈I νl = 1. In
this way, when the randomized auction chooses the lth mixed
integer solution with probability νl, a good approximation
ratio in social cost in expectation may be achieved, as that
achieved by the optimal fractional solution. However, there
in fact does not exist a convex combination of the mixed
integer solutions, that exactly equals the fractional solution;
Algorithm 2 Truth-DR: Truthful Randomized Auction
1: Optimal Fractional Solution
• Solve LPR (2), obtaining optimal BES usage y∗ and optimal
fractional winner decisions x∗.
2: Decomposition into Mixed Integer Solutions
• Decompose the fractional decisions (min{βx∗,1}, βy∗) to
a convex combination of feasible mixed integer solutions
(xl, yl), l ∈ I, of (1) using a convex decomposition
technique, using Alg. 1 as the separation oracle in the
ellipsoid method to solve the primal/dual decomposition
LPs.
3: Winner Determination and Payment
• Select a mixed integer solution (xl, yl) from set I ran-
domly, using weights of the solutions in the decomposition
as probabilities
• Calculate the payment of tenant i as
fi =
{
0 if xi = 0
bi +
∫αγei
bi
min{2x∗i (b,b−i),1}db
min{2x∗i (bi,b−i),1}
otherwise
(min is component-wise minimum in all the above.)
since otherwise, the expected social cost achieved by these
mixed integer solutions equals that achieved by the fractional
solution, contradicting the fact that the fractional solution
achieves a lower social cost than any possible mixed integer
solution. Therefore, to enable a feasible decomposition, we
need to scale up the optimal fractional solution by a certain
factor. If there exists an approximation algorithm that solves
the underlying winner determination problem with an approxi-
mation ratio of β, then we can use β as the scaling factor [29].
In addition, min{βx∗,1} should be used to replace βx∗, to
be decomposed into a convex combination of feasible integer
solutions xl’s, in order to ensure that the decomposition is
feasible. Otherwise, if there exists an entry in vector βx∗
larger than 1, the decomposition is infeasible: since each entry
in xl is at most 1, with a convex combination, we have that
the left-hand side of (4a)
∑
l∈I νlx
l ≤ 1. The linear program
for this convex decomposition is:
maximize
∑
l∈I
νl (4)
subject to: ∑
l∈I
νlx
l = min{βx∗,1} (4a)
∑
l∈I
νly
l ≤ βy∗ (4b)
∑
l∈I
νl ≤ 1 (4c)
νl ≥ 0, ∀l ∈ I (4d)
The BES cost α is the cost of the colocation operator (auction-
eer) rather than tenants (bidders). The exact decomposition in
(4a) is to ensure that a tenant’s winning probability satisfies
the truthfulness condition in Theorem 2. Non-exact decompo-
sition of βy∗ will not affect the truthfulness of the auction,
and hence (4b) is an inequality rather than an equality.
We can solve the decomposition problem (4) by finding all
the possible mixed integer solutions to (1), and then directly
solve LP (4) to derive the decomposition weights νl’s. But
there are exponentially many possible mixed integer solutions
and hence an exponential number of variables in this LP. We
therefore resort to its dual below, where dual variables µ, ω
and φ are associated with primal constraints (4a), (4b) and
(4c), respectively:
minimize βy∗ω +
N∑
i=1
min{βx∗i , 1}µi + φ (5)
ylω +
∑
i∈N
xliµi + φ ≥ 1, ∀l ∈ I (5a)
ω ≥ 0, φ ≥ 0 (5b)
Though the dual has an exponential number of constraints,
the ellipsoid method can be applied to solve it in polynomial-
time [28]. The ellipsoid method can obtain an optimal dual
solution using a polynomial number of separating hyperplanes.
Algorithm 1 can help find violated dual constraints that act
as separating hyperplanes in the ellipsoid method to cut the
solution space, and a feasible mixed integer solution to (1) can
be derived each time a separating hyperplane is generated.
Hence, a polynomial number of candidate solutions to (1)
are produced through the process of the ellipsoid method,
and the primal decomposition LP (4) can be reduced to a
linear program with a polynomial number of variables (νl’s)
corresponding to these solutions. Then we can solve the
reduced primal problem in polynomial time. The correctness
of the above decomposition method is given in the following
lemma, whose proof is available in the technical report [27].
Lemma 2. The decomposition method correctly obtains a
polynomial number of mixed integer solutions xl’s to the
MinCost problem (1), and convex combination weights νl’s
which achieve the optimal objective value
∑
l∈I νl = 1 for
(4), in polynomial time.
3) Winner Determination and Payment: We decide the win-
ners by randomly selecting a mixed integer solution (xl, yl)
from the set obtained through the decomposition method, with
the weights νl’s in the decomposition as probabilities. We next
design a payment for each winner, such that truthfulness of the
auction can be guaranteed.
We have shown that the optimal fractional solution of our
covering problem cannot be decomposed into a series of
weighted mixed integer solutions through simply scaling it up
by a factor, i.e., βx∗; instead, we decompose {βx∗,1}. Our
new decomposition rules out applications of a fractional-VCG
type of payment. However, we discover that our randomized
solution to (1) satisfies a set of nice properties that enable us
to exploit another route of truthful payment computation.
Let Pi(bi) be the probability that tenant i with bid cost bi
wins in the auction, and b−i denote all bids except (ei, bi).
Our auction renders the following results on Pi(bi).
Lemma 3. Given fixed bids b−i from all other tenants, the
probability that tenant i wins, Pi(bi), is monotonically non-
increasing in bi with Truth-DR. Moreover,
∫∞
0 Pi(b)db <
∞, ∀i ∈ N .
Proof: Assume b′i ≤ bi. Given a fixed b−i, let x
∗
i , x
∗∗
i be the
optimal fractional solution for bidder i when its bid is bi, b′i,
respectively. Note that xi ∈ {0, 1}, thus E[xi] = Pi(bi)× 1+
(1 − Pi(bi)) × 0 = Pi(bi). We then further have Pi(bi) =
E[xi] =
∑
l∈I νlx
l
i = min{βx
∗
i , 1}. We next are going to
prove that x∗∗i ≥ x
∗
i .
Let f(x, bi, b−i) be the value of the objective of the LPR
with bids (bi, b−i) when the solution is x. We have:
f(x∗, bi, b−i) ≤ f(x∗∗, bi, b−i) (6)
f(x∗∗, b′i, b−i) ≤ f(x
∗, b′i, b−i) (7)
Considering the difference between f(x∗, bi, b−i) and
f(x∗, b′i, b−i), we have:
f(x∗, bi, b−i)− f(x
∗, b′i, b−i) = (bi − b
′
i)x
∗
i
Similarly, f(x∗∗, bi, b−i)−f(x∗∗, b′i, b−i) = (bi−b
′
i)x
∗∗
i . For
the sake of contradiction, we suppose x∗∗i < x
∗
i , then
f(x∗∗, bi, b−i)− f(x
∗∗, b′i, b−i) < f(x
∗, bi, b−i)− f(x
∗, b′i, b−i)
(8)
Add (7) to the inequality above, we have:
f(x∗∗, bi, b−i) < f(x
∗, bi, b−i)
which contradicts (6). Therefore x∗∗i ≥ x
∗
i and Pi(b
′
i) ≥
Pi(bi).
In LPR (2), if bi > αγei then x∗i = 0, because if the price
offered by the tenant i is too high, the system will use BES
instead. Therefore Pi(bi) = min{βx∗i , 1} = 0 in this case. We
further have∫ ∞
0
Pi(b)db =
∫ αγei
0
Pi(b)db ≤ αγei <∞.
The sufficient and necessary conditions that we follow to
design our payment scheme, to achieve truthfulness, are:
Theorem 2. [30] [31] A randomized auction with bids b and
payments f is truthful in expectation if and only if
• Pi(bi) is monotonically non-increasing in bi, ∀i ∈ N ;
•
∫∞
0 Pi(b)db <∞, ∀i ∈ N ;
• The expected payment satisfies E[fi] = biPi(bi) +∫∞
bi
Pi(b)db, ∀i ∈ N .
We design the payments of winning tenants as
fi = bi +
∫ αγei
bi
min{2x∗i (b, b−i), 1}db
min{2x∗i (bi, b−i), 1}
= bi +
∫ αγei
bi
Pi(b)db
Pi(bi)
where x∗i (bi, b−i) is the optimal solution of variable xi to
LPR (2), when tenant i’s bid cost is bi, and others are b−i.
As we can calculate Pi(bi) by solving LPR (2) given bi,
then the payment fi can be calculated numerically.
Theorem 3. Truth-DR in Algorithm 2 runs in polynomial time,
is truthful in expectation, individually rational, and achieves
2-approximation in colocation-wide social cost.
Proof: Based on Lemma 3, it is ready to see that each step
in Algorithm 2 involves polynomial-time computation only.
According to Lemma 3, Truth-DR satisfies the first two
conditions in Theorem 2. Furthermore, we have
E[fi] = (1− Pi(bi))× 0 + Pi(bi)×
(
bi +
∫ αγei
bi
Pi(b)db
Pi(bi)
)
= biPi(bi) +
∫ ∞
bi
Pi(b)db
The last equality is due to
∫ αγei
bi
Pi(b)db =
∫∞
bi
Pi(b)db as
proven in Lemma 3. Hence Truth-DR is truthful in expectation.
The utility of tenant i when it reports its true cost ci is:
Case 1: tenant i loses, and its utility ui = 0;
Case 2: tenant i wins, and its utility
ui = fi − ci = ci +
∫ αγei
ci
Pi(b)db
Pi(ci)
− ci
=
∫ αγei
ci
Pi(b)db
Pi(ci)
≥ 0
In both cases, the utility is non-negative, and so Truth-DR is
individually rational.
The expected social cost is E[αy + bTx], satisfying
E[αy+ bTx] ≤ βαy∗+ bT min{βx∗,1} ≤ βOPTLPR ≤ βOPT.
Since we use Algorithm 1 to solve the MinCost problem (1)
with an approximation ratio of β = 2 according to Theorem
1, Truth-DR achieves a 2-approximation to the optimal social
cost in expectation.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Data Sets and Simulation Setup
We consider a colocation data center, with six participating
tenants (denoted as Tenant #1, Tenant #2, · · · , and Tenant #6),
located at Ashburn, VA, which is a major data center market
served by PJM (a major regional transmission organization in
the U.S. [23]). Each tenant i has mi = 10, 000 homogeneous
servers with idle/static and computing powers of d0,i = 100W
and dc,i = 150W each, respectively [13]. The PUE γ of
colocation is set to 1.6 (typical for colocation), and the default
cost for using BES, α, is considered $150/MWh which we will
vary later depending on the BES energy source [13], [24]. The
peak power demand of the colocation is 24MW.
Energy reduction targets: We scale down the total energy
reduction by PJM’s EDR on January 7, 2014 (when there was
severe weather condition) [23], to levels around 15% of the
colocation’s maximum power, to produce the energy reduction
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Fig. 2: Trace data. (a) Total EDR energy reduction by PJM on January
7, 2014. (b) Normalized workloads.
targets in our experiments. We choose 15% because field tests
[5] show that data centers can reduce 10-20% energy without
affecting normal operation. The total EDR energy reduction
by PJM is shown in Fig. 2(a). There were 11 EDR events,
starting from 5am to 11am and 16pm to 19pm, respectively,
and each event lasted one hour.
Workload:We use traces collected from [32] (“Hotmail” and
“MSR”) and [33] (“Wikipedia”), and, due to limited traces,
we duplicate them with randomness of up to 20% to generate
the six tenants’ workloads. All workloads are normalized with
respect to each tenant’s maximum service capacity. Fig. 2(b)
depicts the three traces.
Tenants’ Energy Reduction bids: We consider that tenants
use the widely-studied knob of “turning off unused servers”
to slash energy consumption [32]. In our simulations, the
number of servers to turn off by tenant i, ni, is decided using
a widely-considered average queueing delay constraint [13],
[32]: Suppose the service rate of a server owned by tenant i is
µi (e.g., jobs per unit time) and the workload arrival rate is λi;
based on the queueing theory [32], the average job queueing
delay is 1
µi−
λi
mi−ni
, which is required not to exceed a threshold.
We set the parameters according to [13] (e.g., for interactive
services, µ = 1, 000req/second and delay threshold is 20ms).
By turning off ni servers, total power consumption of tenant
i’s servers becomes p′i = (mi − ni) ·
[
d0,i + dc,i
λi
(mi−ni)·µi
]
,
where λi
mi−ni
is the average server utilization (with workloads
equally distributed to the servers) [32]. Thus, when no server
is turned off (i.e., ni = 0), the total power consumption is
pi = mi ·
[
d0,i + dc,i
λi
mi·µi
]
, and the total energy reduction
by tenant i is ei = (pi− p′i) ·T = ni · d0,i ·T , where T is one
EDR period, which is 1 hour in our simulations.
Tenants’ Costs: We consider that tenant i’s power man-
agement cost (e.g., wear-and-tear) for the energy reduction ei
increases linearly with ni, the number of servers turned off,
with a slope uniformly distributed between 1 ∼ 2 cents/server
(equivalently, 6.7 ∼ 13.3 cents/kWh). This can reasonably
model tenants’ costs, because: when tenants house servers
in their own data centers, they save 6.7 ∼ 13.3 cents/kWh
(depending on electricity price), which is naturally enough to
cover the power management cost [32].
B. Results
Our evaluation results are shown below.
1) Close-to-Minimum Social Cost: We first compare the
social costs achieved by Truth-DR, the optimal integer solution
to the MinCost problem in (1), as well as the optimal fractional
solution to its LPR in (2), as illustrated in Fig. 3. We obtain
the average social cost of our randomized auction by executing
Algorithm 2 for 10 times. We observe that Truth-DR provides
almost the optimal performance at most time slots, only a
slightly higher than the optimum when t = 11. The results
show a close-to-optimum performance in practice, much better
than the theoretical performance bound proven in Theorem 1.
2) Satisfying Energy Reduction Target: Fig. 4 plots the
energy reduction achieved by Truth-DR at each time period,
showing that Truth-DR for EDR reaches all energy reduction
targets exactly at most time slots except t = 11, where Truth-
DR produces even more reduction than requested. We further
detail the energy reduction provided by each tenant and BES
in Fig. 5.
3) Tenants’ Non-Negative Utilities: Next, we show the
payments and utilities received by different tenants in EDR.
Fig. 6 illustrates the payments paid by the colocation operator
to all tenants. We observe that tenant i receives no payment
when it does not reduce its energy consumption. Fig. 7 shows
that all tenants receive non-negative utilities by reducing server
energy and participating in EDR, confirming the individual
rationality.
4) Social Cost Reduction Compared to “BES Only”: We
show that Truth-DR reduces the colocation-wide social cost
compared to using only BES without incentivizing tenants,
under different BES costs α from 150$/MWh to 350$/MWh,
where 350$/MWh is the cost for using diesel generators based
on typical diesel efficiency [34]. Fig. 8 shows that there is a
trend that the social cost saving is more significant as the BES
usage gets costlier. Even when α = 150$/MWh, there is still a
significant saving, showing that Truth-DR enables colocation
EDR at a low colocation-wide cost by incentivizing tenants’
participation.
Other results, such as tenants’ truthfulness (i.e., a tenant’s
net utility decreases if it claims a falsified cost, as already
formally proved in Theorem 3), are omitted for brevity.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This work studied how to enable colocation EDR at the
minimum colocation-wide cost. To address the challenges
of uncoordinated power management and tenants’ lack of
incentives for EDR, we proposed a first-of-its-kind auction-
based incentive mechanism, called Truth-DR, which is com-
putationally efficient, truthful in expectation and guarantees
a 2-approximation in colocation-wide social cost. We also
performed a trace-driven simulation study to complement the
analysis and showed that Truth-DR can achieve the energy
reduction target for EDR at a low colocation-wide cost,
while ensuring that truthfulness and individual rationality are
preserved for tenants during the auction process.
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